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We introduce a new continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocol, self-referenced CV-
QKD, that eliminates the need for transmission of a high-power local oscillator between the communicating
parties. In this protocol, each signal pulse is accompanied by a reference pulse (or a pair of twin reference
pulses), used to align Alice’s and Bob’s measurement bases. The method of phase estimation and compensation
based on the reference pulse measurement can be viewed as a quantum analog of intradyne detection used in
classical coherent communication, which extracts the phase information from the modulated signal. We present
a proof-of-principle, fiber-based experimental demonstration of the protocol and quantify the expected secret
key rates by expressing them in terms of experimental parameters. Our analysis of the secret key rate fully takes
into account the inherent uncertainty associated with the quantum nature of the reference pulse(s) and quantifies
the limit at which the theoretical key rate approaches that of the respective conventional protocol that requires
local oscillator transmission. The self-referenced protocol greatly simplifies the hardware required for CV-
QKD, especially for potential integrated photonics implementations of transmitters and receivers, with minimum
sacrifice of performance. As such, it provides a pathway towards scalable integrated CV-QKD transceivers, a
vital step towards large-scale QKD networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), which enables the gen-
eration of secure shared randomness between two distant par-
ties (Alice and Bob) [1], is the most advanced quantum tech-
nology to date [2–4]. Discrete-variable QKD (DV-QKD) is
the term for well-established protocols that involve genera-
tion and detection of extremely weak pulses of light (ideally,
single photons). Unfortunately, significant technological chal-
lenges still remain in generation and detection of single pho-
tons, although important advances have been made over past
three decades [4, 5]. Protocols for an alternative approach,
continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD), were developed more
recently [2, 6]. CV-QKD utilizes conjugate continuous de-
grees of freedom (field quadratures) of a light pulse prepared
in a Gaussian (coherent or squeezed) state to transmit the sig-
nals that constitute the shared randomness. At the receiver, the
quadratures are measured using shot-noise limited balanced
homodyne or heterodyne detectors, which have the advantage
of not requiring single photon detection and operating at ex-
tremely high detection rates (on the order of GHz). In particu-
lar, the coherent-state CV-QKD protocol has received much
attention because of its promise of achieving information-
theoretically secure key distribution with modest technolog-
ical resources [7–9]. The technical ease of CV-QKD is bal-
anced by more complex and less efficient post-processing
schemes for distilling a shared secret key from the imper-
fect shared randomness established during the quantum signal
exchange portion of the protocol. However, with the recent
development of higher efficiency error correction codes [10–
12] and more comprehensive security proofs [13–15] for CV-
QKD, it is becoming an attractive alternative to DV-QKD. A
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particular reason for the appeal is the expectation that the in-
tegrated photonics implementation of CV-QKD will be easier
than that of DV-QKD, and such implementations are critical
for the next phase of QKD development that is focused on
practicality and wide-spread utilization.
A major obstacle to the implementation of CV-QKD, espe-
cially in integrated photonics, is the requirement for transmis-
sion of a local oscillator (LO) between Alice and Bob. Current
fiber-based implementations co-transmit the LO with the sig-
nal states using techniques that involve combinations of time-
division multiplexing (TDM), wavelength-division multiplex-
ing (WDM), and polarization encoding [10, 16]. Free-space
implementations of CV-QKD also multiplex using the polar-
ization degree of freedom [17]. Since the LO intensity dic-
tates the quality of quadrature measurement at Bob’s receiver,
it is desirable to transmit a high-power LO that is many orders
of magnitude more intense than the signal pulse. Due to this
power disparity, multiplexing has to significantly separate the
two components in order to minimize the contamination of the
signal states by photons scattered from the LO (for example,
this is the reason for combining polarization encoding with
TDM, as in Ref. [10]). This degree of separation in multiplex-
ing (and associated demultiplexing at Bob’s receiver) greatly
complicates the hardware required for CV-QKD, and is even
a roadblock for integrated photonics implementations of CV-
QKD since TDM and polarization manipulation and mainte-
nance are more difficult on-chip [18–20]. Another compli-
cation associated with the requirement of LO transmission is
that a relative phase shift arises between the signal and LO due
to the path separation during demultiplexing at the receiver
[16, 21]. This shift can be compensated by precise calibration
of the separated paths, which is however not a robust solu-
tion, or by dynamic phase estimation at the receiver, in which
case the speed at which this estimation can be done becomes
a practical limitation on the rate of key generation.
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2FIG. 1. Hardware schematic for the SR-CV-QKD protocol. In con-
trast to conventional CV-QKD implementations (e.g., Ref. [10]), the
hardware requirements are dramatically simplified due to elimination
of LO transmission.
In this work, we eliminate all of the issues outlined above
by developing a coherent-state CV-QKD protocol that elimi-
nates the transmission of an LO between Alice and Bob. We
achieve this by noticing that a common reference frame be-
tween Alice and Bob can be established by a method that,
instead of transmitting the LO, uses regularly spaced refer-
ence pulses whose quadratures are measured by Bob to esti-
mate Alice’s phase reference. This new protocol, which we
call self-referenced CV-QKD (SR-CV-QKD), greatly simpli-
fies the hardware requirements at Alice’s and Bob’s stations
since it enables them both to employ independent (truly local)
LOs. In addition, SR-CV-QKD obviates a key assumption of
most CV-QKD security proofs [14] — namely that the LO is
trusted — and thus provides a more secure implementation of
CV-QKD. We demonstrate the key elements of SR-CV-QKD
using a fiber-based setup utilizing fiber-pigtailed bulk-optics
components. However, we stress that this protocol is mani-
festly compatible with chip-scale implementation since it only
requires (low-loss and low-noise) classical optical communi-
cation components, as outlined in Fig. 1.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
SR-CV-QKD protocol is described in Sec. II. In Sec. III we
use the entanglement-based theoretical description of SR-CV-
QKD to analyze the secret key rate under individual and col-
lective Gaussian attacks. Section IV presents the details of
the experimental demonstration of the protocol’s feasibility.
Finally, our conclusions are summarized in Sec. V.
II. DETAILS OF THE SR-CV-QKD PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the prepare-and-measure ver-
sion of the protocol, which corresponds to the actual physical
implementation. The equivalent entanglement-based descrip-
tion is presented in Sec. III.
In each round of SR-CV-QKD, Alice chooses two inde-
pendent Gaussian random variables (qA, pA), both distributed
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FIG. 2. The phase-space representation of Alice’s and Bob’s mis-
aligned reference frames. The reference pulse is assumed to be on
the QA axis for Alice in this example, and the signal pulse is ran-
domly placed.
as N (0, VA), and sends Bob the coherent state |qA + ipA〉,
which we refer to as the signal pulse. In addition, she sends a
coherent-state reference pulse in the next time bin. The mean
quadrature values of the reference pulse in Alice’s reference
frame, (qAR , pAR ),
1 are publicly known. The amplitude of
the reference pulse,2 V 1/2R = (q
2
AR
+ p2AR)
1/2, is fixed and
may be several times larger than V 1/2A , but much smaller than
that of a typical LO. Using reference pulses with a relatively
small amplitude is a practically important aspect of SR-CV-
QKD, which helps to reduce the interference with the signal
pulse, as compared to the effect of a large-amplitude (classi-
cal) pulse, whose “long tail” cannot be completely suppressed
and hence would interfere with the signal if time multiplexed
at the same rate.
In each round, Bob performs a homodyne measurement of
one of the quadratures (QB or PB) of the received signal pulse
to estimate its mean value (qB or pB , respectively), where
these quadratures are defined relative to his own high-power
LO. He also performs a heterodyne measurement on the re-
ceived reference pulse to obtain both of its mean quadrature
values, qBR and pBR (again, with respect to his LO).
The phase-space representation of Alice’s and Bob’s mis-
aligned reference frames is shown in Fig. 2. The phase differ-
ence θ between Alice’s and Bob’s frames is a time-dependent
quantity since their individual LOs are free-running, and we
assume that θ at any time is a random variable distributed uni-
formly on (−pi, pi] and that the frequency of its fluctuations
1 We use lowercase letters q and p for c-number mean values of quadratures
and capital letters Q and P for quadrature operators.
2 Throughout this paper, we express all quadrature variances and correlations
in shot-noise units, N0, and all quadrature values and amplitudes in units
of N1/20 .
3(i.e., the phase noise bandwidth), fθ, which is measured and
calibrated before the protocol begins, is much lower than the
rate of pulse generation. In other words, let ∆t be the time
delay between signal and reference plus the duration of both
pulses. Then, we require that this duration is much shorter
than the inverse of the bandwidth fθ, i.e.,
∆t f−1θ . (1)
Provided that condition (1) is satisfied, the θ value will be the
same for measurements on both pulses. We note that Eq. (1)
also places a restriction on the phase stability of Alice’s laser
source; specifically, this source should be phase stable over
the time period specified by ∆t. The same phase stability is
required of Bob’s LO.
Estimation of the phase difference θ is the key element in
SR-CV-QKD. Since Bob knows the mean quadrature values
of the reference pulse both in Alice’s frame, (qAR , pAR ), and
in his own frame, (qBR , pBR ), he can calculate an estimate θˆ
of the phase difference, via:(
qBR
pBR
)
=
√
Teff
(
cos θˆ − sin θˆ
sin θˆ cos θˆ
)(
qAR
pAR
)
, (2)
where 0 < Teff ≤ 1 is the effective channel transmittance that
can be eliminated to obtain
θˆ = tan−1
(
pBRqAR − qBRpAR
qBRqAR + pBRpAR
)
. (3)
In the following we will assume without loss of generality that
Alice’s reference pulse has pAR = 0, in which case Eq. (3)
becomes
θˆ = tan−1
(
pBR
qBR
)
. (4)
Since the reference pulse has a relatively small amplitude, its
quantum uncertainty cannot be ignored, and therefore even in
the case of a technically ideal measurement, there will be an
error in the phase difference estimate, i.e.,
θˆ = θ + ϕ, (5)
where the estimation error ϕ is a random variable distributed
according to some probability distribution P(ϕ). We assume
that θ and ϕ are independent random variables, since they
arise from separate physical processes. We will see in Sec. III
that the error of phase difference estimation plays a critical
role in determining the expected secret key rate of SR-CV-
QKD.
As is standard in modern CV-QKD, our protocol employs
reverse reconciliation. Bob sends Alice his estimate of the
phase difference between their frames, θˆ, and which quadra-
ture of the signal pulse (QB or PB) he measured. Then Alice
rotates her tabulated values for the signal pulse by θˆ, to obtain
an estimate (qˆB or pˆB) of Bob’s measured quadrature value,
via (
qˆB
pˆB
)
=
√
Teff
(
cos θˆ − sin θˆ
sin θˆ cos θˆ
)(
qA
pA
)
. (6)
At this point Alice and Bob share a partially correlated Gaus-
sian random variable and the remainder of the protocol is the
same as conventional CV-QKD, which proceeds by perform-
ing channel estimation, error correction, and privacy amplifi-
cation after a large enough block of (imperfect) shared ran-
domness has been collected [9, 10].
We mention a number of points about the new protocol be-
fore examining it quantitatively. First, the occurrence ratio
of reference pulses to signal pulses does not have to be 1:1.
If the phase drift is significantly slower than the signal pulse
rate, then one can utilize fewer reference pulses to estimate the
slow drifting phase difference. In this situation, condition (1)
should hold for ∆t being the period between subsequent ref-
erence pulses.
Second, the frequency difference between Alice’s source
and Bob’s LO should be reasonably stable: this can be ac-
complished through the use of single-frequency lasers locked
individually to a stable reference frequency such as an atomic
line. In case the stable frequency reference is difficult to im-
plement, commercially available single-frequency lasers can
still be utilized. If the relative frequency drift is slow and
the linewidth is sufficiently narrow, the drift can be treated
as a phase noise, which the SR-CV-QKD scheme will han-
dle. However, if the relative frequency drift is fast, one should
consider frequency locking Bob’s LO by utilizing a dedi-
cated locking beam and utilizing the transfer cavity technique
[22, 23]. We note that synchronizing separate laser sources
may turn out to be a particularly challenging task in circum-
stances where practical limitations on laser properties exist
(e.g., limited coherence properties of available on-chip lasers
for integrated photonics implementations).
Third, utilizing a heterodyne detector and a homodyne de-
tector in concert (heterodyne for reference pulses and homo-
dyne for signal pulses) can be challenging since consecutive
pulses need to be routed to the correct detector. This can be
accomplished by either actually having two types of detectors
and routing each pulse accordingly, or, more practically, by
frequency detuning the local oscillator from the carrier fre-
quency when a heterodyne detection is required. Such small
detuning can be performed at GHz rates and thus this solu-
tion is valid if the pulses are nanosecond separated. How-
ever, in some instances Bob may be restricted to performing
homodyne measurements only, for example, if it is desirable
to simplify his receiver hardware as much as possible. In
this case Alice can send a pair of closely spaced twin ref-
erence pulses, and Bob will perform orthogonal quadrature
measurements on them sequentially, obtaining qBR from the
measurement on one reference pulse and pBR from the mea-
surement on the other. In addition to hardware simplification,
this twin-reference-pulse mode results in a lower uncertainty
of the phase difference estimate, as quantified in Sec. III be-
low, but at the expense of a reduction in the number of time
bins available for signal pulses (which constitute the raw data
for the eventual key) for a fixed communication time.
Finally, we note that using reference pulses to perform
phase drift estimation is not only useful for the SR-CV-QKD
protocol per se, but also for calibration purposes before and
during the protocol. This technical improvement is discussed
4in more detail in Appendix B.
III. SECRET KEY RATE ANALYSIS
While claims of secure key distribution should be based
on empirically estimated correlations between Alice and Bob
[15], it is common to calculate an expected secret key rate
based on reasonable assumptions on the communication chan-
nel and detection apparatus. The usefulness of such a theoret-
ical analysis is in revealing the effects of various design pa-
rameters on the achievable key rate. This calculation is partic-
ularly important in our case since it allows us to compare the
expected performance of SR-CV-QKD against the respective
conventional protocol that requires LO transmission.
We follow the approach in Refs. [2, 24] and compute the
asymptotic expected key rate in the presence of a lossy, noisy
passive Gaussian process, E , that models channel transmit-
tance, channel excess noise, detection inefficiency, and elec-
tronic detector noise. The entanglement-based description
of the conventional protocol begins with the density matrix
for the state shared between Alice and Bob before they per-
form any measurements: ρAB = E(ρSV ), where ρSV is
the ideal two-mode squeezed vacuum state. Since ρSV and
E are Gaussian, one can equivalently express the state ρAB
in terms of its covariance matrix (represented in the basis
{QA, PA, QB , PB}) [2, 24]:
γAB =
(
V 1 Cσz
Cσz Tη(V + χ)1
)
(7)
with
C =
√
Tη(V 2 − 1), (8)
where 1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
and σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. In Eqs. (7) and (8), T
is the channel transmittance, η is the detector efficiency (so
the overall effective transmittance is Teff = Tη), χ is the
channel noise (referred to the input of the channel), and V
is the variance of both quadratures of Alice’s output state, i.e.,
V = VA + 1, where VA is the variance of Alice’s Gaussian
modulation of the signal pulse. The noise can be modeled as
a sum of three terms [2]:
χ =
1− Tη
Tη
+
Vel
Tη
+ ε, (9)
where the first term is the loss-induced vacuum noise, the sec-
ond term is the contribution of the detector electronic noise
with the variance Vel, and ε is the excess noise in the channel.
Note that this noise model treats channel and detector contri-
butions on equal footing, thus resulting in a conservative esti-
mate of the expected key rate. Some works [9, 21, 25, 26] use
a more nuanced model which assumes that Eve cannot benefit
from the noise added by Bob’s detector, therefore resulting in
a more optimistic key rate estimate. In this work, we use the
conservative noise model of Ref. [2], which corresponds to a
stronger security scenario.
In SR-CV-QKD, in addition to the process E , we need to
take into account the effect of phase-space rotations due to
the reference frame mismatch, including averaging over dis-
tributions of random variables θ and ϕ. The resulting density
matrix for the state shared between Alice and Bob before they
perform any measurements is
ρAB = ρAB(θˆ, θ) =
∫ pi
−pi
dϕP(ϕ)
∫ pi
−pi
dθ
2pi
ρAB(θˆ, θ) (10)
with
ρAB(θˆ, θ) = UA(−θˆ)UB(θ)ρABU†A(−θˆ)U†B(θ), (11)
where UA(B)(φ) is the operator of a phase-space rotation of
Alice’s (Bob’s) mode by angle φ. The interpretation of this
state is that Bob’s mode undergoes a rotation by the angle
equal to the actual phase difference θ, and Alice attempts to
compensate for this by applying a rotation of her mode by the
angle −θˆ. Note that in the ideal case where θˆ = θ, these ro-
tations describe an orthogonal transformation of Bob’s state
and the conjugate orthogonal transformation [27] of Alice’s
state, whose combination leaves the bipartite state invariant,
i.e., ρAB(θ, θ) = ρAB and, consequently, ρAB = ρAB in the
ideal case. Thus, in the entanglement-based description, the
SR-CV-QKD protocol can be seen as an attempt to restore the
imperfect EPR correlations in the state UB(θ)ρABU
†
B(θ) by
compensating for the random rotation experienced by Bob’s
mode.
The state ρAB is also Gaussian, and its covariance matrix
can be expressed as
γAB = γAB(θˆ, θ) =
∫ pi
−pi
dϕP(ϕ)
∫ pi
−pi
dθ
2pi
γAB(θˆ, θ) (12)
with
γAB(θˆ, θ) =
[
UA(−θˆ)⊕ UB(θ)
]
γAB
[
UTA(−θˆ)⊕ UTB(θ)
]
,
(13)
whereUA(B) is the symplectic representation of a phase-space
rotation operator UA(B) [6]. Computing these rotations and
integrals yields
γAB =
(
V 1 CΦ
CΦ Tη(V + χ)1
)
(14)
with
Φ =
(
cosϕ sinϕ
sinϕ −cosϕ
)
, (15)
cosϕ =
∫ pi
−pi dϕP(ϕ) cosϕ,
sinϕ =
∫ pi
−pi dϕP(ϕ) sinϕ.
(16)
Comparing the covariance matrix γAB of Eq. (14) to γAB of
Eq. (7), we see that the effect of the reference frame align-
ment in SR-CV-QKD is to replace σz by Φ in off-diagonal
blocks. In the following we will assume that the phase esti-
mation error is dominated by the quantum uncertainty of the
5reference pulse(s), in which case the distributionP(ϕ) is sym-
metric around ϕ = 0, and consequently sinϕ = 0. Then,
Φ = cosϕσz, (17)
and the effect of the reference frame alignment is to sim-
ply rescale the 〈QAQB〉 and 〈PAPB〉 correlations by the
factor cosϕ. Therefore we can carry over the analysis in
Refs. [2, 24] for the respective conventional CV-QKD proto-
col, and simply replace the off-diagonal blocks in the covari-
ance matrix by the scaled versions.
A more visual way for evaluating variances and correlations
in SR-CV-QKD is by using the Heisenberg picture, i.e., apply-
ing the phase-space rotations to the quadrature operators,(
QA(θˆ)
PA(θˆ)
)
=
(
cos θˆ − sin θˆ
sin θˆ cos θˆ
)(
QA
PA
)
, (18a)(
QB(θ)
PB(θ)
)
=
(
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ cos θ
)(
QB
PB
)
, (18b)
and evaluating quantum expectation values over the unrotated
state ρAB , as well as averaging over distributions of random
variables θ and ϕ. Using elements of the covariance matrix
γAB , it is straightforward obtain:
〈Q2A〉 =
∫ pi
−pi
dϕP(ϕ)
∫ pi
−pi
dθ
2pi
Tr
[
ρABQ
2
A(θˆ)
]
= V, (19a)
〈Q2B〉 =
∫ pi
−pi
dθ
2pi
Tr
[
ρABQ
2
B(θ)
]
= Tη(V + χ), (19b)
〈QAQB〉 =
∫ pi
−pi
dϕP(ϕ)
∫ pi
−pi
dθ
2pi
Tr
[
ρABQA(θˆ)QB(θ)
]
= Ccosϕ, (19c)
and analogously for other variances and correlations, thus re-
producing the elements of γAB in Eq. (14).
Alice’s preparation of Gaussian-modulated coherent states
in the prepare-and-measure description corresponds to her
performing a heterodyne measurement on the state of mode A
in the entanglement-based description. This heterodyne mea-
surement is equivalent to mixing mode A with vacuum on a
balanced beam splitter and performing homodyne measure-
ments on conjugate quadratures of two output modes A′ and
A′′. Due to the symmetry between the two quadratures, it is
sufficient to consider the measurement of the Q quadrature of
mode A′, which is given by
QA′ =
1√
2
(QA +Qvac) . (20)
Since the vacuum noise is not correlated with any other mode,
it is easy to obtain:
〈Q2A′〉 =
1
2
(〈Q2A〉+ 1) = 12(V + 1), (21a)
〈QA′QB〉 = 1√
2
〈QAQB〉 = 1√
2
Ccosϕ. (21b)
A. Individual attacks
The asymptotic secret key rate against individual attacks for
reverse reconciliation is given by
Kind = βIA′B − IEB , (22)
where 0 < β ≤ 1 is the reconciliation efficiency, IA′B is the
mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s measurements,
and IBE is the mutual information between Eve’s and Bob’s
measurements. These mutual informations are given by
IA′B =
1
2
log2
(
VB
VB|A′
)
, (23a)
IEB =
1
2
log2
(
VB
VB|E
)
, (23b)
where VB = 〈Q2B〉 is the variance of the quadrature QB mea-
sured by Bob, and
VB|A′ = 〈Q2B〉 −
〈QA′QB〉2
〈Q2A′〉
(24)
is the conditional variance that quantifies Alice’s uncertainty
on QB after the measurement of QA′ . Using Eqs. (19) and
(21), we obtain
VB|A′ = Tη[χ+ 1 + (V − 1)ξ] (25)
and
IA′B =
1
2
log2
[
V + χ
χ+ 1 + (V − 1)ξ
]
, (26)
where
ξ = 1− (cosϕ)2. (27)
We see from Eq. (25) that the effect of using the reference
pulse is the increase in the conditional variance by the addi-
tional term
∆VB|A′ = VB|A′ −
[
VB|A′
]
ξ=0
= Tη(V − 1)ξ. (28)
If the distributionP(ϕ) is tight, then cosϕ ≈ 1− 12ϕ2 and ξ ≈
ϕ2. Also, if condition (1) is satisfied, the θ value is constant
during each θˆ estimation, and the variance of the estimated
value is Vθˆ = Vϕ = ϕ
2 (recall that we assume symmetric
P(ϕ), which implies ϕ = 0). If P(ϕ) monotonically and
rapidly decreases with |ϕ| from the maximum value at ϕ = 0,
the variance Vθˆ = ϕ
2 is a tight upper bound on ξ, i.e., ξ / Vθˆ,
and, consequently,
∆VB|A′ / Tη(V − 1)Vθˆ. (29)
We can evaluate Vθˆ by expressing it as
Vθˆ =
∫ pi
−pi
dθ
2pi
(∂θˆ
∂z
)2
Vz

θˆ=θ
, (30)
6where z = tan θˆ = pBR/qBR , ∂θˆ/∂z = cos
2 θˆ, and
Vz =
(
VQBR + δR
q2BR
+
VPBR + δR
p2BR
)
z2 (31)
is the dimensionless variance of the measured value of z. In
Eq. (31), δR = 1 in the single-reference-pulse mode (a hetero-
dyne measurement is performed on a single reference pulse)
and δR = 0 in the twin-reference-pulse mode (sequential ho-
modyne measurements are performed on a pair of twin refer-
ence pulses). In general, the value of Vz depends on the modu-
lation used by Alice to generate reference pulses. In particular,
for fixed mean quadrature values qAR = V
1/2
R and pAR = 0,
we find:
VQBR = VPBR = Tη(χ+ 1), (32a)
q2BR = TηVR cos
2 θˆ, (32b)
p2BR = TηVR sin
2 θˆ. (32c)
By substituting these expressions into Eqs. (31) and (30), we
obtain:
Vθˆ =
χ+ 1
VR
+
δR
TηVR
. (33)
Correspondingly, the tight upper bound on the conditional
variance increase due to the reference pulse use, given by
Eq. (29), can be now expressed in terms of experimental pa-
rameters:
∆VB′|A′ /
(V − 1)[Tη(χ+ 1) + δR]
VR
, (34)
which scales as VA/VR. The corresponding lower bound on
the mutual information between Alice and Bob is
IA′B '
1
2
log2
 V + χ
(χ+ 1)
(
1 + V−1VR
)
+ (V−1)δRTηVR
 , (35)
Now, to evaluate the mutual information between Eve and
Bob, one can apply the Heisenberg uncertainty relation to the
pure state held by Bob conditioned on Alice’s and Eve’s mea-
surements, to obtain [2]:
VB|EVB|A ≥ 1, (36)
where, due to the symmetry between Q and P quadratures,
B stands for any quadrature of Bob’s mode. By substituting
inequality (36) into Eq. (23b), we obtain:
IEB ≤1
2
log2
(
VBVB|A
)
=
1
2
log2
{
(Tη)2(V + χ)
V
[
V χ+ 1 + (V 2 − 1)ξ]}
/1
2
log2
{
(Tη)2(V + χ)
V
[
V χ+ 1
+(V 2 − 1)
(
χ+ 1
VR
+
δR
TηVR
)]}
, (37)
where in the last line we have used ξ / Vθˆ to express the
bound on mutual information in terms of experimental param-
eters.
Finally, putting together the bounds in Eqs. (35) and (37),
we obtain the minimum key rate that is secure against individ-
ual attacks,Kind ≥ Kminind , expressed in terms of experimental
parameters:
Kminind =
β
2
log2
 V + χ
(χ+ 1)
(
1 + V−1VR
)
+ (V−1)δRTηVR

− 1
2
log2
{
(Tη)2(V + χ)
V
[
V χ+ 1
+(V 2 − 1)
(
χ+ 1
VR
+
δR
TηVR
)]}
. (38)
Note that all terms associated with the reference pulse’s quan-
tum uncertainty reduce the key rate and scale inversely with
VR. In the limit of a large-amplitude (classical) reference
pulse, VR → ∞, the theoretical key rate of SR-CV-QKD is
the same as that for the respective conventional CV-QKD pro-
tocol that requires LO transmission [2, 24]. However, even in
this limit, SR-CV-QKD could still be practically advantageous
since it avoids many technical difficulties associated with LO
transmission, as detailed in Sec. I.
B. Collective attacks
The expected secret key rate against collective attacks for
reverse reconciliation is given by
Kcol = βIA′B − χBE , (39)
where the lower bound on IA′B is given by Eq. (35) and χBE
is the Holevo quantity for Eve’s maximum accessible informa-
tion. For Gaussian protocols, the Holevo quantity is [21, 24]
χBE = S(ρAB)− S(ρqBA ), (40)
where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of the state ρ, ρAB
is the state shared between Alice and Bob before they per-
form any measurements, and ρqBA is the state of Alice’s sys-
tem conditional on Bob’s measurement outcome qB . Since
these states are Gaussian, the entropy is evaluated in terms of
symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrices of the cor-
responding states [6]. This procedure results in [24]
χBE = G
(
λ1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ2 − 1
2
)
−G
(
λ3 − 1
2
)
, (41)
whereG(x) = (x+1) log2(x+1)−x log2(x), and the eigen-
values λi are obtained from
λ21,2 =
1
2
(∆±
√
∆2 − 4D2), (42a)
∆ = V 2(1− 2Tη) + (Tη)2(V + χ)2
+2Tη
[
1 + (V 2 − 1)ξ] , (42b)
D = Tη
[
V χ+ 1 + (V 2 − 1)ξ] , (42c)
λ23 = V
V χ+ 1 + (V 2 − 1)ξ
V + χ
. (42d)
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FIG. 3. Expected minimum key rates for the SR-CV-QKD proto-
col, secure against (a) individual attacks and (b) collective attacks, as
functions of the effective transmittance Teff = Tη. The parameter
values used are VA = 40, ε = 0.01, Vel = 0.01 (all in shot-noise
units), β = 0.95, δR = 1. As shown in the legend, different curves
correspond to different values of the reference-pulse amplitude V 1/2R
(specifically, VR/VA = {10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500}), along with the
curve for ξ = 0, in which case the key rate is the same as that for
the respective conventional CV-QKD protocol with LO transmission.
The curves terminate on the left at values of Teff below which the ex-
pected secret key rate is zero.
Furthermore, we find that χBE monotonically increases as
ξ increases, and therefore we can upper bound χBE using
ξ ≤ Vθˆ. Thus, replacing ξ in Eqs. (42) with expression (33)
for Vθˆ completes the derivation of the minimum expected key
rate that is secure against collective attacks, Kcol ≥ Kmincol ,
in terms of experimental parameters. We note that since SR-
CV-QKD is a Gaussian protocol, security against collective
attacks is sufficient for asymptotic unconditional security (i.e.,
security against coherent attacks) with some processing over-
head [28, 29].
Figure 3 shows the expected minimum key rates secure
against individual and collective attacks, as expressed by
Kminind and K
min
col , respectively. Each plot shows the key rate
as a function of the effective transmittance Teff = Tη, for
a number of reference-pulse amplitude values (VR/VA =
{10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500} with VA = 40) and also for ξ = 0
(which results in the same key rate as the respective con-
ventional CV-QKD protocol with LO transmission). We see
that as VR increases the performance of SR-CV-QKD ap-
proaches that of conventional CV-QKD, and at VR ∼ 500VA
the achievable key rates are very similar for the two proto-
cols. Figure 3 shows results for the single-reference-pulse
mode (δR = 1); the results for the twin-reference-pulse mode
(δR = 0) are very similar, except that smaller values of
VR/VA are required to approach the ξ = 0 curve, which is
a result of the higher accuracy of the phase difference estima-
tion possible in this mode of operation.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL CHARACTERIZATION AND
DEMONSTRATION
The primary benefit of the SR-CV-QKD protocol is the re-
duction in hardware it enables at the transmitter and receiver.
A schematic of our proof-of-principle experimental imple-
mentation of the SR-CV-QKD protocol is shown in Fig. 4.
Since our purpose is to demonstrate the feasibility of the SR-
CV-QKD protocol, the channel fiber length between Alice and
Bob in all of the experiments reported on below was only 5 m.
Also, as shown in Fig. 4, we used a single laser for both Al-
ice’s and Bob’s stations, which sat on the same optical table.
We note that this was purely a matter of experimental conve-
nience in a situation with limited resources, while any practi-
cal implementation of the protocol will definitely require sep-
arate laser sources for Alice and Bob. In addition, the use of a
common laser source obviates the need to frequency lock Al-
ice’s and Bob’s lasers, an additional experimental challenge
that would have to be tackled in a practical setup as discussed
in Sec. II. Nevertheless, crucial to this demonstration, due
to the difference between the paths from the laser source to
Alice’s modulation component and from the laser source to
Bob’s detection apparatus, the phase difference between Al-
ice’s and Bob’s frames was random and fluctuating (as shown
below in Fig. 5).
Extending the SR-CV-QKD operation to practical distances
and including the use of separate laser sources in Alices and
Bobs stations, are part of ongoing work in our laboratory. Fur-
ther details of the current experimental setup are given in Ap-
pendix A.
A. Signal retrieval under strong phase noise
We first demonstrate the ability of the protocol to detect the
phase drift and compensate for it. For this purpose we let Bob
compensate his measured quadrature values rather than send
the phase estimate to Alice. Each signal pulse is prepared
in a constant coherent state and is accompanied by a refer-
ence pulse that is also prepared in a constant coherent state
with with mean quadrature values (qAR , pAR) = (30, 0). Bob
measures both Q and P quadratures of signal and reference
pulses using his own LO, and the measured data are shown
in Figs. 5(a) and 5(b). The fluctuations of measured mean
quadrature values of both signal and reference pulses indi-
8FIG. 4. Schematic of experimental setup for proof-of-principle
demonstration of SR-CV-QKD. The only difference between this
schematic and Fig. 1 is the use of a shared laser source between
Alice and Bob for experimental convenience.
(a) Reference pulses (b) Signal pulses
(c) Estimated phase angle (d) Compensated signal
FIG. 5. Phase drift estimation and compensation for constant sig-
nal pulses. Bob’s measured voltages proportional to mean values of
Q quadrature (blue dots) and P quadrature (red dots) for (a) refer-
ence pulses and (b) signal pulses. (c) Estimated values θˆ of the phase
difference between Alice’s and Bob’s frames. Each data point is cal-
culated as in Eq. (4) using mean quadrature values qBR and pBR
obtained from sequential homodyne measurements on a pair of twin
reference pulses. (d) Mean values of Q quadrature (blue dots) and P
quadrature (red dots) for signal pulses, after a rotation by the angle
−θˆ to compensate for the phase drift.
cate the phase drift happening in the setup. Bob’s estimate of
the drifting phase, calculated using measurements of reference
pulses’ quadratures, is shown in Fig. 5(c), and mean quadra-
ture values of signal pulses, compensated in accordance with
the estimated phase, are shown in Fig. 5(d). The compensa-
tion successfully recovers the constant signal that Alice sent
despite the variation of the phase difference between Alice’s
and Bob’s frames. The phase-space representation of Bob’s
compensated signal is shown in Fig. 6. The variances of the
FIG. 6. The phase-space representation of reconstructed signal
pulses after phase drift compensation.
reconstructed signal data is 1.16.
We note that in this setup Bob was restricted to performing
homodyne measurements and therefore could measure only
one quadrature per pulse. Therefore Alice sent two identi-
cal signal pulses and two identical reference pulses in succes-
sion (the twin-pulse mode). The time taken for Bob to per-
form homodyne measurements on all four pulses (16 µs) is
much shorter than the characteristic time of phase fluctuations
(f−1θ ∼ 200 µs).
B. Signal constellation reconstruction and noise estimation
Next, we report reconstruction of a constellation of sig-
nal pulses, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the self-
referenced technique for signals over a large area in the phase
space. In this experiment, we used a square grid in Alice’s
phase plane, with tiles of size 5× 5 and centers of tiles span-
ning from -15 to 15 in both quadrature axes (for a total of 49
tiles). Alice generated 1000 identical signal pulses prepared
in a coherent state centered on each tile, and sent them to Bob.
Each pair of signal pulses was accompanied by a pair of ref-
erence pulses; all reference pulses were identical with mean
quadrature values (qAR , pAR) = (30, 0). Bob performed ho-
modyne measurements of Q and P quadratures on each pair
of twin signal pulses (resulting in 500 paired data points for
each grid tile), as well as on each pair of twin reference pulses.
In the same manner as described in Sec. IV A above, Bob used
quadrature measurements on reference pulses to estimate the
fluctuating phase difference between his and Alice’s frames,
and then compensated for estimated phase values to recover
signal pulses sent by Alice. Figure 7 shows the reconstructed
constellation of signal pulses. The distribution of Bob’s re-
constructed signals is quite uniform in both quadratures for
each of the grid tiles. However, one can notice the known
“zero anomaly” [30, 31], which is manifested as a skewed
distribution of reconstructed values near the vacuum, arising
due to a finite extinction ratio of Alice’s electro-optic modu-
9FIG. 7. The phase-space representation of signal pulses recon-
structed using quadrature measurements on reference pulses and
phase difference estimation.
lator (EOM) used for amplitude modulation. This undesirable
effect can be mitigated by using an EOM with a higher ex-
tinction ratio or chaining multiple EOMs to achieve greater
extinction.
Typical Gaussian-modulated coherent-state pulses used as
signals in CV-QKD have the modulation variance VA ∼ 40,
and the purpose of the presented example is to demonstrate
that such signals can be accurately reconstructed using refer-
ence pulses and phase difference estimation. We emphasize
that during this entire experiment (which involved transmis-
sion of 49,000 signal pulses and reconstruction of 24,500 pairs
of mean quadrature values) we did not have to concern our-
selves with the stability of Bob’s LO since the random phase
drift was compensated at all times using the self-referenced
technique.
Next, we extended the characterization of signal pulses to
the evaluation of the excess noise in the combined system, in-
cluding Alice’s encoding and Bob’s decoding apparatus. In
this experiment, we used the same reconstruction procedure
for a constellation of coherent-state signal pulses as described
above, but applied it to a different sample. With a finer grid
tiling (2.5 × 2.5), the number of tiles was four times greater
(for a total of 196 tiles), but only 250 identical signal pulses
were generated for each tile. After performing the reconstruc-
tion of the signal’s mean quadrature values, we calculated the
variance of the reconstructed data for each grid tile. Figure 8
shows this variance as a function of the location on the phase-
plane grid. Any variance in excess of 1 is the excess noise
introduced by the experimental apparatus, channel, or phase
estimation procedure. We note that the variance distribution is
quite uniform (0.95–1.2) over much of the considered phase-
plane region. The average variance value over the entire con-
stellation is 1.16. Thus the entire apparatus, including the
phase compensation step, has a total excess noise of 0.16. This
excess noise is due to several experimental imperfections, in-
FIG. 8. The variance of the reconstructed signal data as a function of
the phase-space location.
cluding non-uniform performance and calibration of EOMs
across the phase plane and electronic noise in detectors.
C. Demonstration of SR-CV-QKD with Gaussian modulation
In addition to the above experiments that utilized the self-
referenced technique for reconstruction of signal pulses in the
presence of phase fluctuations and for characterization of the
excess noise, we also performed the quantum components of
an experimental secret key distribution using the SR-CV-QKD
protocol. The QKD experiment was performed under a strong
phase noise between Alice’s signal-generating laser and Bob’s
LO.
We used a pseudo-random number generator based on the
Mersenne twister for Alice’s signal modulation and Bob’s
measurement axis selection. Each communication block con-
sisted of 24,500 data points. Alice’s pulse generation rate was
250 kHz; two thirds of these were identical reference pulses
(used in the twin-reference-pulse mode), and one-third were
signal pulses prepared in random Gaussian-modulated coher-
ent states. Alice’s Gaussian modulation variance was VA =
34, and mean quadrature values of reference pulses were
(qAR , pAR) = (30, 0), corresponding to VR/VA ≈ 26.47
3. Since the transmission was only across an optical table,
3 This (relatively low) value of the VR/VA ratio is related to the fact that, in
our proof-of-principle experiment, we placed more importance on the mea-
surement precision rather than on the distance or rate of the key distribu-
tion. Specifically, due to the limited dynamic range of our analog-to-digital
converter (ADC), the maximum value of VR had to be restricted in order to
achieve a high precision of the signal homodyne measurement. This is not
a fundamental restriction since ADCs with better resolution are available
and moreover, in practical long-distance QKD, the required homodyne pre-
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T = 1. Accounting for detector efficiency, homodyne visi-
bility, and imperfections in homodyne arm balancing, Bob’s
homodyne efficiency was estimated to be η = 0.719 on aver-
age, however due to fluctuating mode-matching and homo-
dyne arm balancing conditions this efficiency can fluctuate
±0.1.
At each round (consisting of two reference pulses and one
signal pulse), Bob estimated the phase difference between his
and Alise’s frames and communicated this estimate to Alice,
who performed the compensation rotation on the tabulated
random values of the signal pulse quadratures.
In each session, among the 24,500 pulses exchanged, 2000
were randomly selected for estimation of the covariance ma-
trix between Alice’s and Bob’s measurements during the pa-
rameter estimation stage. An example of such an estimated
covariance matrix is:
γpm,expAB =
 33.9637 −0.9647 31.1408 −0.0763−0.9647 34.3744 −1.0830 30.705431.1408 −1.0830 29.4003 −0.2307
−0.0763 30.7054 −0.2307 28.2540
 .
(43)
Note that this covariance matrix corresponds to the prepare-
and-measure version of the protocol and thus differs from
γAB of Eq. (14). The theoretical form of γ
pm
AB is
γpm,theAB =
(
VA1
√
TηVAcosϕ1√
TηVAcosϕ1 Tη(VA + 1 + χ)1
)
, (44)
where we used the assumption of symmetric P(ϕ) to set
sinϕ = 0. We can achieve reasonably good agreement
between this theoretical form and the experimentally recon-
structed covariance matrix using the above values for VA,
VR, and T , along with the calibrated values  = 0.01 and
Vel = 0.01, and a value of homodyne efficiency at the up-
per limits of our calibrated range, η = 0.8, which yields the
theoretical covariance matrix
γpm,theAB =
 34.000 0.000 30.389 0.0000.000 34.000 0.000 30.38930.389 0.000 28.218 0.000
0.000 30.389 0.000 28.218
 . (45)
Using the above parameter values, we also calculate mu-
tual information bounds: IA′B ' 2.37 bit/round, IEB ≤
1.492 bit/round, and χBE / 1.742 bit/round (a round con-
sists of three pulses, two reference and one signal). As-
suming the reconciliation efficiency value of β = 0.95,
the expected minimum key rates secure against individual
and collective attacks are Kminind ≈ 0.759 bit/round and
Kmincol ≈ 0.509 bit/round, respectively. Taking into account
that SR-CV-QKD in the twin-reference-pulse mode utilizes
three pulses per round, the key rates per physical pulse would
be three times lower. Finally, with the pulse generation rate
cision is less stringent (typically less than 5 binary digits), especially when
the signal-to-noise ratio is less than 1.
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FIG. 9. Expected key rates as a function of transmission distance for
current experimental setup and a range of post-processing efficiency
values (β). The parameters used are: VA = 34, VR = 900, δR =
0,  = 0.01, Vel = 0.01 and pulse rate of 250 kHz. The homodyne
efficiency was taken to be the average value (this quantity fluctuates
in our setup — see main text) of η = 0.719. The transmission loss
was taken to be 0.2 dB/km.
of 250 kHz, the expected minimum key rates are Kminind ≈
63.26 kbit/s and Kmincol ≈ 42.45 kbit/s.
It should be noted that the primary factor that dictates the
key rate in our setup is the pulse generation rate. We had
to maintain this at the low rate of 250 kHz because the data
acquisition hardware we used (National Instruments, PCIE-
6363) supports only 250 kHz signal generation and measure-
ment rates (taking into account rise and fall times of pulses).
This demonstration is a proof-of-principle of the SR-CV-
QKD protocol and the feasibility of phase difference estima-
tion and compensation using reference pulses. Therefore we
choose a negligible transmission distance. In Figure 9 we plot
the achievable key rates as a function of transmission distance
using this experimental setup for a range of post-processing
efficiencies. The next generation of this experiment will in-
clude an upgrade of this hardware to increase pulse genera-
tion rates and focus on increasing key rate and extending key
distribution distance using SR-CV-QKD.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We have developed a new protocol, SR-CV-QKD, that
eliminates the need to transmit an LO. The removal of this
demand dramatically simplifies the hardware required to per-
form CV-QKD and removes the most significant obstacles to
developing integrated photonics implementations of CV-QKD
transceivers. We thus believe that this new protocol will play
a key role in enabling the miniaturization of CV-QKD hard-
ware, which has the potential to significantly enhance the ap-
plicability of quantum communications.
In the reported experiments, we characterized the core new
element of SR-CV-QKD, signal reconstruction through com-
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pensation of the drifting phase, and performed a proof-of-
principle demonstration of key distribution using the new pro-
tocol. On the theory side, we computed expected key rates,
secure under a passive Gaussian channel assumption. A prin-
cipal feature of our security analysis is the incorporation of the
inherent quantum uncertainty of reference pulses. We showed
that as the reference pulse amplitude increases, the key rate of
SR-CV-QKD approaches that of conventional CV-QKD with
LO transmission, but that this rate can be achieved with much
simpler hardware. Our analysis has focused on asymptotic
key rates as a first step in understanding the new prototol, but
we expect that recent results in that calculate secure key rates
with finite-size effects included [13–15] can be adapted to SR-
CV-QKD.
A way to view the difference between SR-CV-QKD and
conventional CV-QKD is that while the latter physically trans-
mits a reference frame (in the form of the LO), the former only
transmits information about the reference frame. As a result,
SR-CV-QKD is immune against many of the recently identi-
fied side-channel attacks that exploit detection using a pub-
licly shared high-power LO [32, 33]. Of course, it remains to
be seen whether new side channel attacks that target SR-CV-
QKD are possible.
In this work, we focused on a version of SR-CV-QKD, in
which Alice prepares signal and reference pulses in coherent
states, and Bob performs a homodyne measurement on the
signal pulse. More generally, it is possible (in analogy with a
variety of conventional CV-QKD protocols [24]) to consider
alternative versions of SR-CV-QKD. For example, Alice can
prepare the signal pulse in a squeezed state, Alice can pre-
pare a pair of reference pulses in orthogonal squeezed states,
Bob can perform a heterodyne measurement on the signal
pulse, Bob can perform a homodyne measurement of a ran-
dom quadrature, and so on.
It should be noted that in classical optical communication
based on coherent detection, reference laser pulses have been
used as a direct phase reference for signal generation and
phase noise cancellation and stabilization. In particular, in for-
mats involving quadrature phase-shift keying and quadrature
amplitude modulation, the self-homodyne detection (SHD)
approach [34–36] makes use of dedicated pilot carrier pulses
that are multiplexed with the signal pulses from the same
laser to enable homodyne detection at the receiver. SR-CV-
QKD is in the same spirit as these techniques, except that, un-
like SHD, our protocol enables absolute amplitude and phase
measurement in the low-photon-number regime with encod-
ing and decoding capabilities across a continuous amplitude
and phase variation in real-time. The method of phase estima-
tion and compensation underlying the SR-CV-QKD protocol
can be considered a close quantum analog of intradyne detec-
tion [37], another approach used in classical coherent com-
munication, which digitally estimates phase (and frequency)
drifts using measurements on part of the modulated signal
pulse. An important aspect of adapting this technique to CV-
QKD is that the measurement for phase estimation should be
performed on a dedicated reference pulse rather than directly
on the signal pulse, because at the intensity levels used for
CV-QKD, detection of any portion of the signal pulse would
severely decrease achievable key rates. As a matter of fact, the
precision of phase estimation achieved via the direct measure-
ment on the signal pulse would correspond to SR-CV-QKD
with VR/VA < 1. According to Fig. 3, such a low VR/VA
value would not be practical (this is because QKD operates
near shot-noise levels). Therefore, dedicated reference pulses
with sufficiently large amplitude are required as prescribed by
SR-CV-QKD.
Previous CV-QKD experiments have made use of strong
calibration pulses to compensate for phase drifts created by
the signal and LO having different propagation paths at the re-
ceiver [38–40]. However, it should be noted that these experi-
ments co-transmitted the signal and LO and hence do not use
the phase compensation to its full extent. Also, in the context
of the B92 DV-QKD protocol [41], Koashi has constructed a
modified scheme whereby Bob estimates the phase difference
between his and Alice’s lasers [42]. However, unlike in SR-
CV-QKD where this estimate is used to modify Alice’s clas-
sical data, Koashi’s scheme uses the estimate to phase shift
a weak field that interferes with Alice’s signal. The SR-CV-
QKD protocol is practically much simpler since no dynamic
tuning of optical components conditioned on the phase esti-
mate (optical feed forward control) has to be performed.
We note that this new CV-QKD protocol was independently
discovered by Qi et al., as recently reported in Ref. [26]. Qi et
al. present a complementary study of the protocol, including
its implementation to perform key distribution over a 25 km
link, which goes beyond our proof-of-principle demonstra-
tion. In contrast, in this work, we focused on a comprehensive
analysis of the fundamental limits of the protocol (expected
secret key rate calculations taking into account the quantum
uncertainty of reference pulses and accuracy of the phase es-
timation, in Sec. III), and characterization of the performance
of the central new element in the protocol: phase drift com-
pensation using reference pulses (in Sec. IV). Note that the
expected key rates calculated by Qi et al.are larger than those
calculated in this work because while we use the strictest se-
curity criterion [2], Qi et al.use the relaxed criterion where
calibrated noise and loss at Bob’s receiver are assumed to be
out of Eve’s control. Our results, along with the demonstration
in Qi et al. [26], establish SR-CV-QKD as a practical protocol
with significant benefits in terms of hardware simplification
and potential compatibility with integrated photonics.
Finally, while this manuscript was under review Huang et
al. reported on an implementation of CV-QKD over a 25-km
link without transmission of a local oscillator, which utilizes
a protocol that is essentially the same as SR-CV-QKD [43].
Ongoing work in our laboratory is focused on increasing
the key rate and transmission distance of the SR-CV-QKD link
and increasing the stability and robustness of the transmitter
and receiver components.
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Appendix A: Experimental details
In this appendix, we provide the details of our experimental
setup.
The laser source was a fiber-pigtailed New Focus single-
frequency laser at 1550 nm, with an optical bandwidth of
∼ 100 kHz, and a maximum output power of 7 mW. After an
in-line polarizer, the polarization extinction ratio was 35 dB
(all fiber used in the experiment was polarization maintaining
Panda PM1300 fiber). An acousto-optic modulator (Brim-
rose) modulated the output of the laser at 250 kHz with in-
dividual pulse duration of 200 ns. The amplitude and phase
of the light were modulated through 10 GHz fiber-pigtailed
amplitude and phase EOMs (Thorlabs).
At Bob’s station, received light pulses were detected using a
homodyne setup, as shown in Fig. 1. Although in practice Bob
will use an independent laser as an LO for homodyne mea-
surements, in our experiment, for simplicity, Alice and Bob
shared the same single-frequency laser source. However, it is
critical to note that, due to the difference between the paths
from the laser source to Alice’s modulation component and
from the laser source to Bob’s detection apparatus, the phase
difference between Alice’s and Bob’s frames was random and
fluctuating (as shown in Fig. 5). Bob’s LO power was 0.1 mW.
For homodyne detection, we used a polarization-maintaining
fiber beam splitter with an approximately 51:49 splitting ratio
(Thorlabs). We attached a mechanical variable optical attenu-
ator to each leg after the beam splitter to balance the power
between the two legs. For the balanced detector, we used
a commercially available switchable-gain fast InGaAs detec-
tor (Thorlabs PDB450C). The detection bandwidth was set at
45 MHz where we observed that the dark current noise was
approximately 25 dB lower than the shot noise from Bob’s
LO. Accounting for detector efficiency, homodyne visibility,
and imperfections in homodyne arm balancing, Bob’s homo-
dyne efficiency was estimated to be η = 0.719 on average,
however due to fluctuating mode-matching and homodyne
arm balancing conditions this efficiency can fluctuate ±0.1.
We are currently making progress in understanding the root
causes of this uncertainty and how to stabilize it.
For data collection and analog voltage generation for the
EOMs, we used a commercially available data acquisition
card (NI PCIE-6363), capable of reliably collecting multi-
channel data at 250 kHz. Since the analog output of this card
has 1 MΩ impedance while the EOM’s RF modulation in-
put has 50 Ω impedance, we built in a fast unity-gain voltage
follower to match the impedances. All data generation and
collection were performed through Matlab’s data acquisition
toolbox based codes.
(a) Raw data (b) Calibration curve after phase
drift compensation
FIG. 10. In-situ calibration of a phase EOM using reference pulses
and phase drift compensation. (a) Raw data collected while the
modulation voltage is swept from −3.5 V to 3.5 V within the time
window (5–58 ms); red: in-phase value of the reference pulse, ma-
genta: quadrature value of the reference pulse, blue: in-phase value
of the phase-modulated pulse, cyan: quadrature value of the phase-
modulated pulse. (b) The calibration curve between the applied volt-
age and the induced phase after phase drift compensation; blue dots:
calibration data, red line: polynomial fit.
Appendix B: Device calibration with reference pulses
The technique of using reference pulses and phase estima-
tion to compensate for phase drifts is valuable not only for
running the CV-QKD protocol per se, but also for the calibra-
tion of Alice’s and Bob’s apparatus. Since CV-QKD operates
at the limits of detection, it is vital to calibrate, and maintain
calibration of, the modulators and homodyne detectors in the
setup. Typically, this calibration is done locally by Alice and
Bob to minimize security loopholes, and for this reason Al-
ice’s station should have homodyne or heterodyne detection
capabilities and Bob’s station should have pulse generation
capabilities. In this appendix, we present a calibration task
that Alice and Bob need to perform and show that it benefits
greatly from the use of reference pulses and phase estimation.
It is critical that the phase induced by Alice’s and Bob’s
phase EOM is well calibrated against the applied voltage; i.e.,
the actual phase modulation should correspond accurately to
the random numbers generated by Alice, or the measurement
axis chosen by Bob. In a long-running CV-QKD implemen-
tation, this calibration may have to be performed repeatedly
since EOM characteristics can drift over time. The calibration
requires performing a test phase modulation and measuring
its value. The measurement is performed using a homodyne
setup that utilizes an LO generated from the same master laser
as the modulated pulse. As a result, this calibration requires
precise knowledge of the path difference (which results in a
relative phase shift) between the modulation path and the LO
path. This path difference can fluctuate due to thermal effects
and tracking it requires a considerable effort.
Noting that the calibration problem in the presence of a
phase drift is very similar to the problem of establishing a
common phase reference in CV-QKD, it is clear that we can
alternatively use reference pulses to perform the EOM phase
calibration. That is, during the calibration stage, each phase-
modulated pulse is accompanied by a reference pulse (with
13
no phase modulation). The procedure of heterodyne measure-
ment and phase estimation on this reference pulse tells us what
the reference zero phase modulation value is, and this can be
used to recover the actual phase of the modulated pulse.
Figure 10(a) shows raw measured values for the phase-
modulated pulse when the EOM voltage is swept from−3.5 V
to 3.5 V, along with those for the accompanying reference
pulse. Within this voltage range the EOM response is reason-
ably linear. The raw voltages show that the phase does drift
over the timescale of the sweep. However, Fig. 10(b) shows
that by estimating the drifting phase and compensating for it,
one can obtain a clean calibration map between the applied
voltage and the induced phase.
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